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Consumers' Valuation of Insecticide
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Economic assessments of pesticide regulations  typically focus on producer impacts
and generally ignore  possible changes in product demand. These  changes may be
nonnegligible  if real  and/or  perceived  product  attributes  change.  We  measure
consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for the elimination of one insecticide and also
a whole group of insecticides in apple  production using a multiple-round  Vickrey
auction. The data are analyzed using nonparametric  statistical tests and a double-
hurdle model.  Our findings  show that consumer perceptions  of product attributes
change  if pesticides  are removed  from  production,  and this  is reflected  in WTP
changes. WTP is shown to be income elastic.
Key words: consumer experiment, cosmetic quality, double-hurdle model, food safety,
pesticide residues, Vickrey auction, willingness to pay
Introduction
Economic  assessments of pesticide regulation typically focus on producer impacts and
generally ignore possible changes in product demand (see, e.g., Lichtenberg, Parker, and
Zilberman; Rice-Mahr  and Moffit). These changes may be nonnegligible  if real and/or
perceived product attributes change. Studies focusing on the demand side typically elicit
hypothetical  willingness  to pay  (WTP) for a complete  removal of pesticide  use or  of
pesticide residues (Ott; Misra, Huang, and Ott; Weaver, Evans, and Luloff).1Regulators,
however, rarely propose complete elimination of pesticides. Instead, they seek to elimi-
nate or limit the use of specific compounds or classes of compounds.  Inferences from the
existing studies on consumers' WTP for a partial removal of pesticides may not be valid
since stepwise elimination may not result in overall  reduction of pesticide use when
substitute pesticides are available. Consumers who are aware of the substitution possi-
bilities may place little value on the fact that a specific pesticide is not used.
The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996 changes the approach to pesticide
risk assessments.  Rather  than considering  the  risk  from  pesticide  exposure  on  a
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pesticide-by-pesticide  basis, the total risk from all pesticides with a common mode  of
toxic action  now must be  considered.  As  a result  of this change,  organophosphate
insecticides  currently  are  being  subjected  to  increased  scrutiny  (Environmental
Protection Agency; Wiles, Davies, and Campbell). Organophosphates interfere with the
transmission of nervous impulses, leading to a spectrum of cholinergic symptoms, and
are classified as neuroactive insecticides (NAI).2 Of particular concern are the possible
long-term effects on brain function due to chronic exposure to these pesticides in early
childhood (National Research Council; Wiles, Davies, and Campbell).
To study consumers' responses to possible regulation of neuroactive insecticides, we
measure WTP for their elimination in apple production.  In particular, we consider a
cessation of use of one NAI, namely azinphos-methyl (APM), and the group of all NAI.
APM was chosen due to its particularly high toxicity and its central role in current apple
production systems (U.S. Department  of Agriculture/National Agricultural  Statistics
Service).3
This investigation  differs from  many other WTP studies  in the manner in which
values are elicited. Past studies typically have used contingent valuation in mail surveys
(Byrne,  Gempesaw,  and  Toensmeyer;  Misra,  Huang,  and  Ott)  or  interviews  (Ott;
Weaver, Evans, and Luloff). Following methods described by Shogren et al., we create
a market for apples not treated by either APM or the group of NAI.  In this artificial
market, participants  are  endowed  with one bag of apples  produced using standard
methods (i.e., with pesticides),  and are given an opportunity to bid for an upgrade  to
apples produced without either APM or all NAI. Bids are elicited in a multiple-round
Vickrey auction in which participants receive price information from the previous round.
We also elicit bids in a final single-round Vickrey auction.
This  article  proceeds  with  a description  of the  experiment  employed.  We  then
summarize the results and analyze the data using statistical tests and a double-hurdle
model. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings in view of the
1996 FQPA.
Experimental Design
Experimental studies to elicit consumers' WTP for quality changes in food products have
been employed  by a number of researchers, including Buhr et al.,  Melton et al., and
Shogren  et al. We  follow their methodology  in using a multiple-round Vickrey  (i.e.,
second-price) auction that combines the advantage of the true WTP revealing property
of the Vickrey auction with repeated market experience. To control for wealth effects,
only  one  trial,  selected  at  random,  is  usually  enforced.  As  in  Melton  et  al.,  our
experiment features simultaneous valuation of multiple attributes (pesticide use and
appearance), but in contrast to their experiment, we include an initial endowment with
2 Neuroactive  insecticides act by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase,  the enzyme that degrades acetylcholine,  the messenger
of the parasympathetic  nervous system. This results in high acetylcholine  levels, exaggerating the normal functions of the
parasympathetic  system. Acute symptoms can include nausea, vomiting, and irregular heartbeat. This group of insecticides
is of high priority in the implementation  of FQPA.
3 Wiles, Davies, and Campbell conclude that one of the main sources of unsafe exposure of children to risks from organo-
phosphate insecticides occurs via apple products, and that azinphos-methyl is among the five organophosphate insecticides
that present the greatest risk.
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the base quality. Details of the experimental procedure are explained in the following
paragraphs.4
To create the artificial market, we first endowed each participant with a 2.5-pound
bag of Washington State  extra fancy  red delicious  apples.  In the auction procedure,
participants  were  asked  to bid the maximum  amount they  were  willing  to pay  to
exchange  their  endowed  bag  for  each  of  four  alternative  bags.  Each  of the  four
alternatives also contained 2.5 pounds  of Washington  State red delicious apples, but
their pesticide treatment histories differed. Two of the bags offered for exchange  con-
tained apples that received a conventional pesticide treatment but no APM. The other
two bags contained apples that had not been treated byny NAI. The two bags within
each of the pesticide treatment categories  also differed in terms of appearance,  with
apples  in one bag  showing  some  cosmetic  damage  and the other bag being visually
identical to the bag of endowed apples. Participants therefore faced the problem of eval-
uating four different qualities in comparison to a base endowment. Quality is defined
as a two-dimensional vector of cosmetic  and food  safety attributes, the latter being
uncertain. WTP for exchanging the initially endowed bag should be positive if quality
attributes of the alternatives are deemed  superior compared to the base endowment.
Participants  were selected using a random  sample from  a midwestern university
town. The experiments were run in four separate groups with a total of 54 participants.
Prospective households  were contacted by phone, and the person responsible for most
of the grocery shopping in the househouseld was invited tthe experiment. A participation
remittance of $30 was offered and was paid to participants in cash upon their arrival at
the study site.
The complete experiment consisted of six steps. In Step 1, we administered a short
questionnaire  to  collect  demographics  and  information  about  apple  consumption,
attitudes toward food and pesticide policy issues,  and experience  with organic foods.
Following Shogren et al., we then familiarized participants  with the multiple-round
Vickrey auction procedure  by conducting  an auction using candy bars (Step  2). The
preference  revelation property was  emphasized  by explaining why it was in a parti-
cipant's best interest to bid his/her true valuation in the second-price auction. In the
candy bar auction, participants bid to upgrade from an endowed candy bar to each of
four alternatives. Both the binding round (one of three) and the candy bar to be  sold
within  that round  (one  of four) were randomly  selected  at the end  of the  bidding
procedure, and the winning bidder paid cash for the upgrade.
Participants were given their bags of apples in Step 3. To set the stage for the experi-
mental bidding, a questionnaire  for hypothetical  bids was  administered.  It  included
three questions about how much (as a percentage) participants would be willing to pay
for apples not treated with (a) APM, (b) NAI, and (c) any pesticides, assuming the apples
were cosmetically unblemished. The third question served to remind participants that
apples not treated with APM or NAI could be treated with other pesticides.5 In Step 4,
we provided the following information about pesticides and descriptions of the apples
to be auctioned:
4A complete set of experimental instructions is available  from the senior author on request.
5 This is also in line with recommendations  by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Panel on
Contingent Valuation. The Panel suggests that if CVM-type methods are used, then participants should be made aware of
substitution possibilities.
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All the apples in this experiment  are of the same variety (Red Delicious) and were
grown in Washington State. All bags weigh 2.5 pounds. Azinphos-methyl is the most
widely applied insecticide in apple production. It  is, like most other insecticides, a
neuroactive pesticide that works  by interfering  with the transmission  of nervous
impulses. No pesticides that might not have been used on the average apple you buy
in the grocery store have been used on the apples in this experiment.
The apples in bags 2 and 4 were similar in appearance  to the apples of type A (bag  1),
whereas apples in bags 3 and 5 were of lower cosmetic quality. Participants were not
told which bags were regarded  as being of lower  cosmetic  quality, but were  simply
allowed to examine the apples for themselves. All bags were transparent, so there was
no impediment to viewing the apples.
Step 5 was the multiple-round Vickrey auction in which participants were endowed
with type A apples and were asked to bid to upgrade from type A apples to each of the
four alternatives.  The auction followed the same procedure as that used for the candy
bars, with the implication that the binding round would be chosen at the conclusion.
Participants were told that only one bag of apples, selected at the end of the experiment,
would be sold. Following each round of bidding, the second-highest bid and the identifi-
cation number of the highest bidder were announced for each bag. After the third trial,
the following additional information was provided to the participants:
Insecticides are the most important pesticide group in apple production. In fact,
98% of U.S. apple acreage is treated with insecticides.  Almost all insecticides used
in apple production affect the nervous systems of insects. These are called 'neuro-
active' pesticides  and they work by interfering with the transmission  of nervous
impulses.
Azinphos-methyl,  a neuroactive pesticide, is the most widely applied insecticide.
It is used on 86% of apple acreage and it is one of the neuroactive pesticides with the
highest  toxicity.  Many  close  substitutes  for  azinphos-methyl  are  available.  If
azinphos-methyl  were  not  allowed  for  use, it would likely  be  replaced  by other
neuroactive pesticides, but these neuroactive pesticides are likely less toxic.
There are pest control methods available that can control insect pests without the
use of neuroactive pesticides. They are not widely used in practice because they are
relatively  new  and  are  also  more  expensive.  Using  these  methods  instead  of
neuroactive  insecticides would increase the costs of producing apples and increase
the price  of apples.  Bag 4 and bag 5 have been  produced using these alternative
methods.
Bidding then resumed and continued through trial 6. After the sixth bid, participants
were  told that the  seventh  and  final trial  would,  in fact,  be the binding  trial.  We
included this feature to investigate possible differences in bidding behavior between a
TYPE A  TYPE B  TYPE C
(bag 1)  (bag 2 and bag 3)  (bag 4 and bag 5)
These are apples that have  These  are apples produced  These are apples produced
been produced under the  without using the commonly  without using any neuro-
same conditions as those you  used neuroactive  pesticide,  active pesticides. Other
would buy in your grocery  azinphos-methyl.  pesticides might have been
store. Pesticides, including  used.
azinphos-methyl,  have been
used in their production.
370  December 1998Consumers' Valuation of Insecticide Use Restrictions  371
multiple-round auction with random selection of the binding trial and one-shot versions
of the Vickrey auction after market experience.  While there is no evidence to suggest
that random selection  of the binding trial is not incentive-compatible,  we determined
that the issue merited this simple test. Following the seventh bid, the highest bidder
exchanged his/her bag of apples for the randomly selected bag and paid an amount equal
to the second-highest bid. Finally, Step 6 involved an exit qestionnaire asking partici-
pants to clarify their motivation-i.e., why they had or had not bid for each of the bags.
Results
The Sample
Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the sample. We invited the person
primarily responsible for the household grocery shopping; of the 54 participants, females
were in the majority.  The  average  age  was  43 years, most  people had some  college
education, and 46% had a college degree. This is well above average for the region, but
typical of a university community. The same holds true for the annual mean household
income of $46,000. Few subjects came from households with children under five years
of age.
In Step  1 of the experiment, we  asked the participants t  ato  rank (on a scale of 1-5)
their concern about pesticide use in food production,  as well as their pesticide policy
preference (choosing from four policy options provided) (table 1). The latter question also
was used in a questionnaire  employed by Ott.  Overall, 21 of our 54 participants indi-
cated a high degree of concern about pesticide use (rankings of 4 or 5), and 16 of these
individuals expressed a strong preference for a much stricter pesticide regulation (policy
options 3 or 4). Participants also were asked if they would be willing to buy apples with
insect damage. The majority (30) answered no, 20 said maybe, and only four replied that
they would.
Bids to Avoid APM and NAI
Table 2 provides some statistics on bids obtained in the first and final trials. In the first
trial, bids averaged  $0.22 for the upgrade to bags 2 and 4, the apples with no cosmetic
damage. For apples with cosmetic damage, bids were much lower. In the seventh trial,
participants were, on average, willing to pay a premium of $0.34 for apples not treated
by APM, and $0.45 for a similar bag not treated by any NAI.
At the time we conducted this experiment, the price for these apples in local stores
was about $1 per pound. Our average bids, therefore, ranged from 9% of market value
in trial 1 up to about 18% in the final bidding trial. Although this value seems relatively
high, it compares to results obtained by van Ravenswaay and Hoehn. They estimated
an average  WTP to avoid  Alar in fresh apples  ranging from  11% in  1984  (the first
Environmental Protection Agency announcement of possible carcinogenicity of Alar) to
31% in 1989  (climax of the Alar  controversy).  Research  on the price  differential  for
organic produce also has shown that premia can be quite substantial. Using actual mar-
ket data, Thompson and Kidwell report a premium of 42% of market value for organic
red delicious apples.
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of the Experiment Sample
Variable  Description  Mean  SD
Sex (0  = female; 1 = male)
Age (years)
Education (1 = grade 8; 2 = grades 9-11; 3 = high
school graduate or GED; 4 = some technical trade
or business school;  5 = some college, no degree;
6 = B.S./B.A.; 7  = some grad work, no degree;
8 = M.S./M.A.; 9 = Ph.D.)
Employment  (0  = not employed;  1 = employed)
Annual household income ($000s)
Child(ren) age 5 and below in household
Organic  shopping (1 = never; 2 = sometimes;
3 = always)
Frequency:  How often do you eat apples?
(Scale of 0-5, where 0 = never;  5 = every day)
Number of apple eaters in household
Policy Opinion:
1 =  Current pesticides are safe and consumer fears are
unwarranted.
2 = Pesticides can be used safely, but there should be
greater testing.
3  =  Some pesticides  should be banned and greater
restrictions should be placed on remaining
pesticides.

















Variables Related to Issues of Concern:
(Scale of 1-5, where 1 = not concerned;  5  = very concerned)
PESTCONC  Concern about food grown using pesticides  3.20  1.25
FPOICONC  Concern about food poisoning  3.81  1.12
PRCONC  Concern about food prices  3.74  1.20
Variables Related to Importance of Apple Attributes:
(Scale of 1-5, where 1 = not important; 5 = very important)
FLAVOR  Flavor  4.67  0.51
APRICE  Price  3.67  1.17
DAM  Damage  4.15  1.02
APEST  Pesticide use in apple production  2.61  1.27
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics of Bids (first and final trials)
BAG 2  BAG 3  BAG 4  BAG  5
No APM;  No APM;  No NAI;  No NAI;
No Cosmetic  Cosmetic  No Cosmetic  Cosmetic
Description  Damage  Damage  Damage  Damage
Auction, Trial 1:
Average bid  $0.22  $0.08  $0.22  $0.14
Median bid  $0.05  $0.00  $0.10  $0.00
Second-highest bid  $1.25  $0.60  $1.00  $1.00
Average bids w/o zeroes  $0.43  $0.30  $0.45  $0.45
Number of zero bids  26  39  27  37
Inter-group variation  s
2 = 0.0245  s2 = 0.0483  s2 = 0.1376  s2 = 0.0618
Auction, Trial 7:
Average bid  $0.34  $0.21  $0.45  $0.34
Median bid  $0.10  $0.00  $0.25  $0.10
Second-highest  bid  $2.10  $1.75  $2.50  $1.50
Average bids w/o zeroes  $0.62  $0.66  $0.69  $0.66
Number of zero bids  24  37  19  26
Inter-group variation  s2 = 0.1876  s2 = 0.1707  s2 = 0.3914  s2 = 0.2605
A relatively large number of participants were not willing to pay any premium for
the reduction in pesticide use. In particular, 19 of the 54 participants  consistently bid
zero for all of the potential upgrades. Due to the large number of zero bids, median bids
are consistently lower than the mean bids. As expected, more participants declined to
pay  a premium  when  cosmetic  damage  was  present.  Furthermore,  with  cosmetic
damage, the number of zero bids was higher when only one pesticide was removed (table
2). For participants with positive WTP, the average premium ranged from about $0.40
in the first trial to about $0.66 in the final trial.
The development of the average bid for each bag is illustrated in figure 1. It shows
an upward trend in the average bid for the early trials, but a stabilizing of the bids after
trial 4. The set of individuals  who gave bids of zero stayed fairly constant for type B
apples (no APM), and decreased considerably for the type C apples (no NAI). Figures 2a
and 2b graph the median bids for each bag across trials. Clearly, changes occur mostly
for type C apples after the release of additional information.
Performance  of the Multiple-Round Vickrey Auction
with Random Selection of the Binding Trial
The  experimental  design permits testing of a number of hypotheses concerning  the
performance of auction markets as a means of revealing consumer WTP. The additional
information after trial 6, informing participants that the seventh trial would be binding,
provides an opportunity to discern whether the participants viewed the randomization
of the trial selection rationally and thus bid their true WTP in each trial. Serious doubts












Trial 1  Trial 2  Trial  3  Trial 4  Trial 5  Trial 6  Trial 7
Figure 1.  Average bids across trials
would be cast on the true WTP revelation property of the repeated Vickrey auction if,
subsequent to receiving that information, subjects were to change their bids substan-
tially. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that bids are relatively stable over trials 4,  5, and 6, but
a number of participants  continued to vary their bids.  Of the 216  bids,  54 changed
between trials 4 and 5, 46 changed between trials 5 and 6,  and 54 changed between
trials 6 and 7.
We tested the hypothesis of no change in the medians of the distributions of trials
6 and 7 using an ordinary sign test and Wilcoxon's signed rank test (Gibbons).  Tests
about the median are particularly useful here as we do not need to make further distri-
butional assumptions about the data-generating  process. The tests take the pairwise
arrangements of the two samples into account. While the ordinary sign test only takes
account  of the  signs  of deviations  from  the  median,  Wilcoxon's  test  also  uses the
magnitudes of the deviations, thereby strengthening the power of the test. However, the
maintained hypotheses of Wilcoxon's test are also more restrictive in that symmetry of
the distribution is assumed. For both tests, we form te  difference between the bids in
trials 6 and 7 for each individual and each bag. The ordinary sign test then counts the
numbers  of positive and  negative  differences  and  compares  their distribution  to a
binomial distribution with p = 0.5. Wilcoxon's signed rank test assigns ranks to those
differences according to their absolute value. The sum of positive and negative ranks is
compared to tabled values of the test distribution under the null.
Table  3 shows  the statistics for trials  6 and 7 for each bag, where  5x  denotes the
sample mean, m is the sample median,  and s2 is the sample variance.  The results of
the paired  sample tests show that the announcement  about the binding trial had no
374  December 1998




»  Bag 2:  No APM, no cosmetic damage
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Trial 1  Trial 2  Trial 3  Trial 4  Trial 5  Trial 6  Trial 7
Figure 2(b).  Median bids for bags 4 and 5 across trials
--  Bag 4:  No  NAI, no cosmetic damage
.---  Bag 5:  No  NAI, with cosmetic damage
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Table  3.  Statistical  Comparison  of  Trials
Repeated Vickrey Auction
6  and  7:  Performance  of the
Sign Test  Wilcoxon Test
Bags  Trial 6  Trial  7  (p-Value)  (p-Value)
Bag 2  x = 0.3035  x  = 0.3435  0.804  0.187
m=0.10  m =0.10
s2 = 0.4682  s2 = 0.5536
Bag 3  x = 0.2096  x  = 0.2065  0.727  0.889
m = 0.00  m = 0.00
s2 = 0.4682  s2 = 0.4505
Bag 4  2 = 0.3928  x  = 0.4498  0.629  0.097
m = 0.30  m = 0.25
s2 = 0.5452  s2 = 0.6546
Bag 5  x = 0.2862  x = 0.3407  0.267  0.114
m = 0.10  m  = 0.10
s
2 = 0.4107  s
2 = 0.5537
Note:  x denotes the sample mean, m is the sample median, and s2is the sample variance.
significant  effects,  although  Wilcoxon's test is inconclusive  for bag  4.6 We  therefore
conclude that the results of the multiple-round Vickrey auction with random selection
of the binding trial (as in trials 4-6) are consistent with the results of the final single-
shot auction after market experience.
Effect of Information
The  other  hypothesis  we  test is  whether  or  not  the  information  about  pesticides,
supplied following the third bidding trial, had an impact on bids.  For the first three
trials, the only information about pesticides entailed the descriptions of the different
types of apples. We compare the bids from trials 3 and 4, again using an ordinary sign
test and Wilcoxon's signed rank test (table 4).7 The tests clearly reject a zero median for
the distribution  of the bid differences for bags  4 and 5  (no NAI).  Learning about the
substitution possibilities  between pesticides within the group of NAI-i.e., replacing
APM by other NAI-seems to have motivated participants to increase their bids for a
complete removal of the entire group. The tests for bags 2 and 3 are somewhat incon-
clusive. Informing subjects that APM might be replaced by less toxic NAI did not result
in clearly significant changes in WTP.
Table 5 offers another way to look at the effect of information about pesticides. Here
we test for a median difference between bags 2 and 4 (no cosmetic  damage), and bags
3 and 5 (cosmetically damaged) before and after the release of information. The results
6 Wilcoxon's test also assumes symmetry of the distribution.  A rejection of the null hypothesis under the Wilcoxon test,
but not under the sign test, would indicate a rejection of symmetry rather than a rejection of a zero median in the differences.
7 To ensure that the differences found between trial 3 and trial 4 did not stem from an increasing trend in the auction
bid, we also tested the bid data from trial 2 versus trial 3 and did not find any significant differences at the 0.05 significance
level.
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Table 4.  Statistical Comparison of Trials 3 and 4: Effect of Information
Sign Test  Wilcoxon Test
Bags  Trial 3  Trial 4  (p-Value)  (p-Value)
Bag 2  x  = 0.2463  5 = 0.2717  0  0.190
m  =0.10  m  =0.10
s
2 = 0.3301  s2 = 0.3857
Bag 3  x  = 0.1583  x  = 0.2028  0.118  0.099
m  = 0.00  m  0.00
s2 = 0.3516  2= 0.4963
Bag 4  5 = 0.2883  x  = 0.3816  0  0
m  = 0.10  m = 0.25
s2 = 0.4755  s2 = 0.5415
Bag 5  R = 0.1920  5 = 0.2906  0  0.002
m=0.00  m  = 0.10
s2 = 0.2685  s2 = 0.3609
Note:  R denotes the sample mean, m is the sample median, and s2 is the sample variance.
Table 5.  Statistical Comparison of "No APM" versus "No NAI"
Sign Test  Wilcoxon Test
Trials  No APM  No NAI  (p-Value)  (p-Value)
BAG 2  BAG 4
Trial 3  5 = 0.246  R = 0.288  0.500  0.596
m =0.10  m  =0.10
s
2 = 0.330  s
2 = 0.475
BAG 3  BAG 5
Trial 3  R = 0.158  R = 0.192  0.124  0.156
m = 0.00  m = 0.00
s
2 = 0.352  s
2 = 0.291
BAG 2  BAG 4
Trial 4  R = 0.272  x = 0.382  0.067  0.054
m  = 0.10  m = 0.25
s2 = 0.386  s2 = 0.541
BAG 3  BAG 5
Trial 4  R = 0.203  5 = 0.269  0.044  0.025
m= 0.00  m = 0.10
s2 = 0.496  s2 = 0.416
Note:  5 denotes the sample mean, m is the sample median, and s2 is the sample variance.
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suggest that WTP to avoid APM or NAI was not significantly different before the release
of information.  Following the release of information (i.e., in trial 4), those differences
became significant.
Considering this result as an indication of  consumers' perception of the new pesticide
regulation according  to the  1996 Food Quality  Protection Act, bids for bags 2  and 3
can be interpreted as participants' valuation of a single pesticide use restriction as it
would have  occurred  prior to the FQPA.  Bids for bags  4  and 5,  on the other hand,
express consumers' preferences for a use restriction on all pesticides sharing a common
mode of toxic action.  The finding that participants,  once aware  of substitution possi-
bilities, place a higher value on reducing the overall use of pesticides with a common
mode  of toxic  action indicates  support for the new risk regulation  legislated in the
FQPA.
Estimating Consumers' WTP for a Partial
Reduction of Pesticide  Use
The Double-Hurdle  Model
We analyze the WTP using a double-hurdle procedure. Introduced by Cragg, the double-
hurdle model is suitable for estimation of data sets with truncated dependent variables
such as the WTP values that we have elicited. The model is flexible in that explanatory
variables can explain both the likelihood of a positive  observation and its conditional
mean (see Yen and Jones for an application to food consumption).  In the case of WTP
studies for reduced pesticide use, risk perceptions and attitudes determine  the desir-
ability of goods with altered food safety characteristics-the  first hurdle. Once a good
seems desirable, an individual has to decide if, and how much, money should be spent
on the choice-the second hurdle.
Let ri be the variable representing the desirability of buying "reduced pesticide" food
products for consumer i, and let WTP, be the amount spent on the purchase. Then for
each consumer:
(la)  ri  =X 1 iP  +ui;
(Ib)  WTP,  = X2iy  + u2i
Here,  Xji and X2i are the sets of explanatory variables determining the desirability to
buy and WTP, respectively,  while  I  and y are the parameter vectors to be estimated.
The error terms in each equation,  uji, are assumed to be normal with  variances  of
unity and o2,  respectively.  The random variable ri is not directly observable;  one can
only observe  if WTP is positive,  and then conclude  that ri has to be greater than a
certain  threshold which can,  without loss of generality,  be set at zero.  Under these
specifications,  model (1) can be estimated using the following set of likelihood functions
(Cragg):
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(2b)  f(WTPi  Xli, X2i,  WTPi > 0)
= (2t)-1/2a-l exp{-(WTPi - X2iy)2/22 }J((Xlip).
Here, 0 denotes the standard normal cumulative density function.
Estimation
The bid elicited in the seventh and binding trial is used as the dependent variable. WTP
data for all bags were jointly estimated, and fixed effects accounted for differences  in
cosmetic quality and pesticide treatments.  Therefore,  the model was estimated using
216 observations.  The explanatory variables and parameter estimates can be found in
table 6. The first set of explanatory variables (the lefthand side of the table) comprises
the matrix X1 in equation (la), while the second set (the righthand side of the table) is
identified with the matrix X2 in equation (Ib).
The  decision to purchase  produce  from low pesticide input production systems  is
hypothesized to be influenced by concern about pesticide use in food production and con-
cern about food prices. We therefore included the variables PESTCONC and PRCONC
in the first set of variables.  The variable APRICE, measuring the concern about the
price of apples, is included in the second set of variables, as it will influence the decision
on how much to spend  if the reduced pesticide use is preferred.  The decision of how
much to spend also depends on income (INCOME) as well as on the amount of apples
consumed  in the household (CONSUMPTION). To allow for the fact that some con-
sumers might not accept any cosmetically blemished fruit, while others might do so at
a lower price, the variable COSM is included in both sets (COSM = 0 for no cosmetic
damage; COSM = 1 for cosmetic damage). The amount of pesticide use reduction should
also influence the WTP, and so the second set of variables includes the variable NO NAI
(NO NAI  =  0 for type  B apples; NO NAI  = 1  for type  C  apples).  In response to the
National Research Council's report on pesticides in the diets of infants and children, the
FQPA  places  new  emphasis  on the protection  of infants  and  children.  To  see  how
parents of small children respond to the possibility of avoiding NAI in their product
choices, the variable CHILD (measuring the presence of children age five and below in
the household)  was included in both sets of variables. The  same holds for the demo-
graphic variables of age, education,  and sex. The experiment was run in four different
groups,  and  dummies are incorporated  in the second  set of variables  to account for
possible differences between groups due to the variation in the sets of revealed prices.
Parameter estimates have the expected signs (table 6). Concern about pesticide use
in food production increases the probability of a positive WTP, whereas lower cosmetic
quality decreases  it. Concern  about  food prices is not significant in determining the
preference for reduced pesticide use, but concern about apple prices reduces conditional
WTP. Income has a positive and consumption has a negative influence on the WTP. The
magnitude  of pesticide  use  reduction  (NO NAI)  increases  WTP  significantly.  The
presence of cosmetic  damage  reduces  the likelihood of a positive WTP and  also the
conditional WTP. It is interesting to note that the influence of cosmetic damage is more
significant on the likelihood of positive WTP than on the magnitude of WTP, measured
in both its economical and statistical significance.  This is in accord with the findings of
previous studies that there is a strong rejection of cosmetically blemished produce.
Roosen et al.Journal  of Agricultural  and Resource  Economics
































Dummy for Group 1
Dummy for Group 2






































2[ln(L) - ln(L0)]  = 92.989
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are the t-values of the parameter estimates. Single and double asterisks
(*) denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The parameter for the variable CHILD is significant in both sets of variables (table
6). Households with small children are less likely to have a positive WTP, but if they do,
they are willing to pay more. Since the variable INCOME measures household income,
the first result might be due to the fact that households with children will have a lower
income per person. Although none of the demographic variables are individually signif-
icant, jointly they are significant at the 0.1 level. Low t-values for some of the variables
might be due to low variability in the sample.
. I
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Table 7. Explanatory Variables and Elasticity Estimates
Unconditional  Conditional
Variable  Elasticity  Elasticity
INCOME  1.106**  1.061**
(4.899)  (5.207)
CONSUMPTION  -0.391*  -0.376*
(-2.382)  (-2.407)
NO NAI  0.497**  0.322**
(3.845)  (3.437)
COSM"  -0.631  -0.120
(-1.610)  (-0.819)
CHILD  0.395  0.565**
(1.134)  (6.811)
SEX a -0.119  -0.003
(-0.263)  (-0.014)
AGE  0.041  0.354
(0.130)  (1.123)
EDUC  0.481  -0.190
(0.739)  (-0.439)
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are the t-values  of the parameter estimates.
Single and double asterisks (*) denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels,
respectively.
aHere we report Allen elasticities  for discrete variables.
Table  7 reports both the unconditional elasticities  and the elasticities conditioned
on a bid greater than zero.  The elasticities  are evaluated  at the sample mean of the
variables, and  are  calculated  according to the formulas  found  in the appendix.  The
t-values were obtained using a parametric bootstrap of the parameter estimates. WTP
has an income  elasticity  of approximately  unity, and income is highly significant  in
determining  WTP.  Unconditional  and  conditional  WTP  are  inelastic  in apple  con-
sumption. Removing the whole group of NAI versus only APM increases WTP by about
50%, while cosmetic  damage decreases average WTP by 63% and conditional  WTP by
12%. The presence of children increases the overall WTP by 40% and conditional WTP
by 57%.
While the magnitudes of the elasticities should be interpreted cautiously, given the
small size of the sample, estimates  suggest clear conclusions  about the directions and
significance of the variables. There is on average a positive WTP to avoid NAI in apples,
but this WTP diminishes if  quality deteriorates. The net benefit of restricting use of NAI
in apple  production  will  therefore  depend  on  whether  production  systems  can  be
adjusted in a way that allows preservation of current quality. A second issue of rele-
vance to policy formation is that parents of small children have a higher WTP, both on
average and conditionally. This appears to be in accord with the increased protection of
infants and children warranted by the Food Quality Protection Act.
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Conclusion
This investigation used statistical and econometric procedures to analyze WTP data for
a partial reduction of pesticide use on apples. The data obtained in an experimental
auction suggest that consumer perceptions of product attributes change if pesticides are
removed from production,  and this is reflected in WTP changes.  While support for a
positive WTP for nonuse of pesticides was strong if cosmetic attributes remained the
same, this result is weakened considerably if cosmetic quality deteriorates.
New legislation under the FQPA requires that pesticides with a common mode of
toxic action are considered as one group,  and that risks from exposure to pesticides in
this group are considered cumulatively.  This risk management  rule seems consistent
with the risk perceptions expressed by participants in our study. The data show that
WTP to avoid a group of pesticides versus WTP to avoid one pesticide from that group
can increase  significantly  when  consumers  are  aware  of substitution  possibilities.
Information provided to study participants that substitute pesticides from the same
group are less toxic did not increase WTP for the removal of the more toxic one.
The FQPA limits the legal call for economic  consideration in the pesticide regis-
tration process by setting absolute risk limits regardless of cost implications-the so-
called "risk-cup"  of allowed  risk. But the choice  of filling this risk-cup  still requires
economic  analysis  in trading  off the  risks  from  different  pesticides  and  exposure
modes.  To reduce  risk most efficiently,  it  is still necessary  to consider  pesticide cost
effectiveness when making regulatory decisions, and studies focusing on the benefits of
pesticide use are still needed. Such analyses cannot be comprehensive if changes on the
demand side are  ignored.  Our research suggests that these  demand changes  can be
significant.
Consumer WTP studies in experimental auction markets are constrained  in their
sample  size due  to cost consideration and availability  of subjects.  Nevertheless,  the
possibility of controlled information  release and direct measurement  of participants'
reactions enables us to develop a better understanding of consumer choices. The data
generated in this experiment allow clear qualitative conclusions about the existence of
a positive WTP for restrictions in neuroactive insecticide use and about determinants
thereof.  More  comprehensive  market  studies  would  be  needed  to  give  quantitative
welfare measures that could be incorporated into the economic analysis of insecticide
use restrictions.
[Received March 1998; final revision received August 1998.]
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Appendix
Normalize by setting 6 = y/o. Predicted WTP and elasticities can be calculated as follows. The uncondi-
tional expectation of WTP is:
E[WTP]  = X2y ((XlP)((X2o)  + ao(X1p))(X28),
where (  is the standard normal probability density function. The conditional expectation of WTP is:
E[WTP IWTP > 0]  = X26  +  oa(X26),
where
=(X28)
X.(X 26 ) 8)
2(X26)
The derivative  of the unconditional expectation is:
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aE  [WTP]  = pj4(X 1P)[(X 2Y)~(X 26)  + o(X 26)]  + Yj+(XP)D(X26).
ax.
The derivative of the conditional expectation  is:
8E [WTP I WTP>0]  = yj [1 - (X8)( 28)  - (X(X,2 ))2].
ax. J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~